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On 21 July 2016, on the day the UK Parliament was breaking for summer recess, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) issued a set of corrections to its statements 
about arms exports to Saudi Arabia. Having previously stated that the Saudi-led coalition 
was not targeting civilians and had not breached international humanitarian law (IHL) in 
the war in Yemen, the essence of the corrections was that the UK government “have not 
assessed that there has been a breach” of IHL, and “has not assessed that the … coalition 
is targeting civilians” (Ellwood, 2016a). Whilst claiming that the amendments did not 
constitute a change in policy, but rather a clarification for the record, the response was 
scathing. Hilary Benn MP’s tweeted response called it “extraordinary” that such a 
response was “smuggled out on the last day of the session” (Benn 2016). Amnesty 
International (2016a) described it as “jaw-dropping,” beyond doublespeak and “grossly 
misleading parliament.” Oxfam accused the government of being “in denial and disarray,” 
“flagrantly” ignoring its international commitments (Graham-Harrison 2016).  
The government’s shift in public messaging came in the run-up to a judicial review 
of UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Held in February 2017 at the High Court in London, the 
case was brought by Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), who argued that the ongoing 
supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia breaks UK law, which stipulates that the government 
will not export weapons if there is a clear risk that they might be used in serious violations 
of IHL. The judicial review, which eventually found in favour of the government, has been 
the highest profile element of a longer controversy: since the start of the Saudi-led 
coalition’s intervention in the war in Yemen in March 2015, UK arms exports have 
become highly politicised, making headline news and forcing the government to justify 
its policies in the face of criticism. The corrections to the public record ahead of the 
hearing raise the issue of how the government has attempted to handle controversy over 
its arms export policy.  
This article surveys the ways in which the UK government has attempted to 
manage criticism over its arms export policy towards Saudi Arabia. It identifies the key 
strategies used by the UK government to manage domestic criticism – some specific to 
the Saudi case, and some generic – as well as those deployed to maintain and manage the 
relationship with the Saudi government. Paying attention to the discursive strategies 
deployed by the state to manage criticism and navigate the pressures coming from 
different audiences helps us understand how arms exports are justified and facilitated. 
The Saudi case is distinctive, given its centrality to UK arms export and wider foreign 
policy, and the importance and longevity of weapons sales to the bilateral relationship. 
The war in Yemen has created one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, though, to 
which the UK government also claims to be responding effectively. This makes the Saudi 
case a good test of the competing commitments of the UK government, and of the UN 
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Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in 2014 and to which the UK is a State 
Party. How states manage contradictory pressures on sensitive policy areas, and how war 
and violence are facilitated through arms transfers, form the more general context in 
which such a case should be considered.  
UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia  
The use of UK-supplied weapons by the Saudi-led coalition in the war in Yemen 
has generated the biggest parliamentary, media and public outcry since the 1980s “arms 
to Iraq” scandal and the late 1990s controversy over arms sales to Indonesia and the 
Labour government’s “ethical dimension” to foreign policy. Such scandals are relatively 
rare: the broad swathe of arms sales are depoliticised and uncontroversial in the public 
eye, in the UK as well as elsewhere. The UK has been a major arms supplier to Saudi 
Arabia since the 1960s. The Al Yamamah contracts of the 1980s marked the reliance of 
the UK arms industry on the relationship with Saudi Arabia; a relationship further 
cemented with under the more recent Al Salam Project. In these contracts, BAE Systems 
(formerly British Aerospace) acts as the prime contractor to the UK Ministry of Defence 
(MOD): a private company operating on behalf of the state, under a government-to-
government contract. While allegations of corruption have persisted over the years, it 
was not until Saudi intervention in the war in Yemen that the arms relationship became 
more widely controversial.  
Saudi Arabia now accounts for almost half of UK arms exports, and the UK and USA 
together supply over 70% of Saudi weapons imports (SIPRI 2015). Since the start of Saudi 
military involvement in the war in Yemen in March 2015, there has been a massive surge 
in arms orders. Between July and September 2015, for example, the UK government’s 
licensing data showed that it approved over £1 billion of licences for the export of bombs 
to the Saudi Royal Air Force. It also diverted Paveway IV bombs from RAF supplies to 
Saudi Arabia as they were depleting their stocks so rapidly (Milmo 2016). The conduct of 
the war has been subject to extensive allegations of violations of the laws of war. For 
example, the Saudi-led coalition designated the entire towns of Marran and Saada as 
military targets, and launched multiple airstrikes on over fifty hospitals and health 
centres, including a Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) hospital, both of which violate the 
IHL prohibitions against indiscriminate attacks and attacks directed against the civilian 
population (Sands et al, 2015). The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report (2016) 
identified 119 sorties in violation of the laws of war; Human Rights Watch (2016) 
identified thirty-six such airstrikes and fifteen attacks using cluster munitions, and 
Amnesty International (2016b) a further thirty-two unlawful strikes. The UK government 
response to this information  has not been to refuse, revoke or suspend licences; nor has 
there been a slowing of decision making. Indeed, there has been a speeding up of the 
licensing process, and massive increases in the financial value of arms exports to Saudi 
Arabia.  
UK arms exports are bound by its obligations under the EU Common Position (CP) 
and the ATT, which have been incorporated into national policy. Whilst military 
production is significantly globalised and arms transfer control regimes have been 
internationalising, arms exports and their regulation remain a national prerogative. 
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Multilateral regimes such as the ATT and CP must be implemented nationally by states. 
In the UK they are given legal effect through the Consolidated EU and National Arms 
Export Licensing Criteria, which are implemented through risk-based assessment 
processes. For example, and of particular significance in the Saudi case, the government 
must assess (under Criterion 2c) whether there is a “clear risk” that equipment “might” 
be used in serious violations of international humanitarian law, and to deny licences if 
this is the case (Cable 2014). In a highly unusual development, anti-arms trade activists 
took the government to court in a case of judicial review. CAAT claims the government 
has broken its legal commitment to Criterion 2c by failing to “ask correct questions and 
make sufficient enquiries” (CAAT 2017) in its assessments of whether there is a clear risk 
weapons might be used in serious IHL violations. The judges dismissed the claim in July 
2017, finding that the government’s policy is indeed lawful: that the government has 
access to more and better information than activists, and that “the Secretary of State was 
rationally entitled to conclude” that the Saudi-led coalition was not deliberately targeting 
civilians; that Saudi Arabia respects and is committed to complying with IHL, investigates 
controversies, and engages in dialogue with the UK (The Queen v Secretary of State for 
International Trade 2017).1  
The overarching narrative coming from the UK government rests on the claims 
that the UK is not party to the war in Yemen, but supports the right of the Saudi-led 
coalition to come to defence of the legitimate government of Yemen; that the Houthis – 
supported by Iran – are also committing war crimes; that there is no contradiction 
between supplying weapons and providing humanitarian aid; that the strength of the 
relationship is what gives the UK the leverage to push for humanitarian measures and a 
political settlement to end the war; and that the relationship with Saudi Arabia protects 
Britons from terrorism. Yet growing censure for the conduct of the war has forced the UK 
government to engage in extensive efforts to mitigate criticism and manoeuvre amongst 
the contradictory pressures on arms export policy.   
Managing domestic criticism   
There have been five key responses from the UK government to manage domestic 
criticism over arms exports to Saudi Arabia. They range from the general to the specific: 
the first two strategies are generic to arms export licensing policy, and indeed can be seen 
in other policy areas and beyond the UK; while the latter three are specific to the Saudi 
case. First is the strategy of “rigorous repetition”: the frequent, repeated use of a stock 
claim in response to criticisms in parliament and the media. In this, the government 
claims that the UK operates “one of the most rigorous arms export control regimes in the 
world” (at times substituting “rigorous” for “robust” and/or “transparent”), assessing 
licence applications on a case-by-case basis against its licensing criteria (see CAAT n.d., 
a). This is a tautologous move, common across UK arms export licensing policy and seen 
in other policy areas, in which there is no space to acknowledge the possibility of 
violations. By pointing to the existence of a policy that protects human rights and IHL, 
                                                          
1 The ramifications of this decision for a risk-based assessment process, and the gap between what the 
government was “rationally entitled to conclude” and any substantive account of UK complicity in 
violations of IHL are of considerable future interest, and likely to form part of CAAT’s appeal of the 
judgment.  
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and to bureaucratic processes to implement that policy, by definition the government 
cannot have contravened its policy.   
 Second is a deluge of data: the publication of reams of statistics that require 
specialist knowledge to assess, but that impart little meaningful information. The 
government vaunts its transparency through its publication of quarterly licensing 
statistics and twenty other forms of report. More prompt release of licensing data, and an 
ability to make broad-brush analysis of the contours of policy – in the Saudi case as 
elsewhere - is of value to those with specialist knowledge, and the UK is in some respects 
one of the more transparent of the world’s arms exporters. But there are also significant 
amounts of data that are broadly meaningless even to those with such specialist 
knowledge. And the key information never made available (through licensing data, 
follow-up requests or interviews) is how decisions were reached. The politics of data 
provision are illustrated by the launch of a web browser by CAAT that uses the 
government’s own published licensing data and allows observers to run queries that 
show the date on which specific licences were granted, and to relatively confidently 
match Military List codes to the financial value of licences (see CAAT n.d., b). For example, 
it allows us to see that, of the £1bn+ figure for bombs mentioned earlier, a single licence 
for the export of £990,400,000-worth of air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia was approved 
on 8 July 2015. This shows the difference in intent between the government’s and CAAT’s 
presentation of statistics, and the mobilisation of data for the purposes of accountability 
by activists is a step forward. But observers still do not know what the threshold of risk 
was, such that this licence was deemed compatible with UK obligations. More generally, 
the UK government does not collect, let alone publish data on actual deliveries; and is 
increasingly encouraging use of so-called open licences, which allow multiple deliveries 
to named destinations without the need to declare the financial value or amount of 
equipment. 
A third strategy is one of wilful non-knowledge: the failure or unwillingness  of the 
government to look for evidence that it is responsible for searching out as part of the risk 
assessment process, which then allows it to claim there is no reason to deny licences. The 
government’s policy requires an assessment of whether there is a “clear risk” that 
weapons “might” be used in serious IHL violations (Cable 2014). As allegations have 
mounted, the government has refused to respond to the many and varied forms of 
independent analysis by simply ignoring them, later claiming in preparation for the 
judicial review that the government is not obliged to “find or explain why views 
expressed by … third parties are wrong” (Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2016). During the judicial review hearing, attention was paid to the adequacy or 
otherwise of the MOD “Tracker” database in capturing, analysing and assessing relevant 
information (Watkins 2017; Ross and Evans 2017). The government position was that it 
is impossible to track every allegation, that allegations do not equate to violations, and 
that the government possessed other, secret information (which was withheld until the 
closed sessions with Special Advocates) that trumped the material provided in open 
court. Whilst the High Court  verdict found the government’s position to be lawful ,the 
political ramifications of such a claim for a national, EU and international regulatory 
regime based on risk assessment are troubling. A risk-based framework is designed to be 
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preventive; its application in the Saudi case – in which evidence that Saudi Arabia has 
committed serious violations of IHL is not taken to generate a “clear risk” that weapons 
“might” be misused - illustrates the virtues of ambiguity in regulatory language and 
malleability of legal regimes for political gain (Hansen 2016).  
The strategy of wilful non-knowledge also plays out in a fourth practice, that of 
obscuring the role of BAE Systems. BAE Systems is responsible for fulfilling government-
to-government arms agreements with Saudi Arabia. Yet very little is known about the 
contractual and legal arrangements of the agreements, let alone the oversight and 
accountability mechanisms with regard to arms export rules such as Criterion 2c. In its 
response to the parliamentary Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), the 
government claimed that it “do[es] not have full visibility of the prime contractor’s [BAE 
Systems’] manpower footprint in Saudi Arabia” (Secretary of State for International 
Trade et al 2016, 8). Even though the MOD contracts BAE Systems to do this work and 
“Saudi-based members of the MOD Saudi Armed Forces Projects monitor the delivery of 
contracted activities” (Secretary of State for International Trade et al 2016, 8), the MOD 
claims that it “does not maintain a record of the number and location of BAE Systems 
employees in Saudi Arabia,” nor of the tasks they perform (MOD 2017). Whilst the MOD 
oversees “quality standards” and “safety processes”, and “audit[s] the underlying policies 
and training standards” (MOD 2017) it remains unclear what MOD oversight there is of 
BAE Systems activity with regard to IHL, and what the legal chains of responsibility are. 
Any reference to BAE Systems was redacted from the legal documents made available 
from the judicial review hearing. The UK government’s reliance on BAE Systems to carry 
out a government-to-government contract allows the government to hide behind the 
shield of commercial confidentiality, and the company to benefit from the cover of 
government support and redaction of its role from the public record.  
Fifth is the issuing of corrections to the official record. In July 2016, the FCO 
amended previous statements that there “has not been a breach of IHL by the coalition,” 
to the rather different claim that “we have not assessed that there has been a breach of 
IHL by the coalition” (Ellwood 2016a). The clarifications were ostensibly simply a matter 
of consistency of wording, and not a change in policy. Yet civil service emails released 
under the Freedom of Information Act reveal the political context of the review exercise 
that led to the corrections: the “high profile nature of this subject and the attention it is 
getting from Parliament, the media and the courts” (FCO 2016). Government anxiety 
about “consistency of messaging” and what may have been “implied” by the “misdrafted” 
responses (FCO 2016) raises questions about bureaucratic failure, but also about the 
interpretation of policy and political direction given to civil servants. The government 
emphasised that “neither the MOD nor the FCO reaches a conclusion as to whether or not 
an IHL violation has taken place in relation to each and every incident of potential 
concern” (FCO 2016). And the government’s barrister, James Eadie, QC, claimed in court 
that the government, in agreeing to the Consolidated Criteria, did not set itself  up to act 
as “auditors of the armed conflict pursuit [sic] by foreign friendly sovereign 
governments” (Eadie, in CAAT vs. Secretary of State for International Trade, p12). But the 
essence of a criterion-based control regime is judgement and discrimination, in the sense 
of refusing arms export licences when the threshold of international standards is crossed 
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e.g. when there is a clear risk that weapons might be used in serious violations of IHL. . 
While some observers have concluded that the corrections mean that an assessment was 
not conducted (Casey-Maslen 2016) – which would be a straightforward violation of 
policy – it might be the case that assessments have been conducted, but were deemed 
inconclusive, raising more complicated questions about the adequacy of the assessment 
process, the everyday practices of policy implementation and the ends to which that 
policy is put. The main effect of the corrections has been confusion and – presumably an 
unintended effect – further criticism.  
Boomerang effects 
The strategies outlined thus far have primarily been intended to assuage criticism 
from domestic constituencies such as the CAEC and International Development 
Committee; NGOs and campaign groups such as Amnesty International, CAAT, Human 
Rights Watch, Oxfam and Saferworld; and to prepare for the legal challenge. However, a 
crucial audience for these claims is also the Saudi government: the UK government has to 
manage the boomerang effects when criticism from domestic actors reverberates with a 
key arms client. The twists and turns in its defence of the Saudi regime show the difficulty 
the UK government has faced in both assuaging domestic critics and maintaining its 
relationship with the Saudi government.  
One key strand of UK government strategy is the public defence of Saudi practices 
and sovereignty: that there is “no evidence of deliberate breaches” of IHL (Hammond 
2016); that it is important to support the Saudis in the fight against the Houthis (Patel 
2016); that the Houthis may have fabricated evidence of atrocities (Ellwood 2016b); and 
that is “naïve” to say the UK cannot supply its allies with weapons (Ellwood 2016c). As 
criticism has grown, the UK government has defended the Saudi response to allegations, 
describing it as “a country that has never had to be pressed to write a report before” 
(Ellwood 2017). As indicated earlier, the UK government has been careful to make clear 
it is making an “overall assessment” (FCO 2016) or “overall judgement” (Ellwood 2016a) 
in order to meet its export control requirements, and is not judging whether Saudi Arabia, 
a fellow sovereign state, has breached IHL. As the controversy has developed, there has 
been a more robust defence of the Saudi regime, seen in the statement that the Saudis 
“have the best insight into their own military procedures,” and the emphasis that “This is 
the standard we set ourselves and our allies” (Ellwood 2016a). This strategy is part of an 
attempt to manage the bind the UK government is caught in, between international 
commitments to IHL and bilateral commitments to arms clients. Defence of a friendly 
(and politically and economically significant) state’s sovereignty rubs up against the 
essence of a control regime based on judgment and discrimination.  
The need to publicly defend the Saudi regime has been accompanied by muted 
public criticism as the domestic controversy has grown. By January 2017, the 
acknowledgement that Saudi investigations are slow gave way to admission that the UK 
government’s “patience is being tested here” (Ellwood 2017). The public character of the 
airing of differences, the spilling into the media and public statements of dissatisfaction 
from UK politicians has been “unusual; it is not normally the way that British foreign 
policy with regard to the Gulf is constructed” (Stephens 2016). The tone of the 
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engagement is one of ongoing post-imperial nostalgia for British influence and leverage. 
Orientalist tropes of the conservative culture of Saudi Arabia have been accompanied by 
a sense of British reasonableness in trying to encourage them to be more transparent: 
“what we try to do overtly, but also quietly, to advance change in Saudi Arabia” (Ellwood 
2016b).  
A third response that grows out of the previous two is increased pressure on the 
Saudis to engage in public legitimation work. In September 2016, at the same time as the 
CAEC inquiry into arms sales to Saudi Arabia descended into leaks and Newsnight 
appearances on the BBC, and irrevocable splits within and between the constituent 
committees, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir visited the UK to brief MPs, and appear 
on Channel Four News to defend Saudi conduct in the war in Yemen. This unusual move 
suggests efforts by both governments to mitigate reputational damage done by the 
controversy and shows the work that goes into maintaining the arms relationship. A key 
mode of public legitimation by the Saudi government has been the managed and partial 
responses published by the Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT). Established in 
response to international criticism, the JIAT found “shortcomings in two cases while the 
rest were in line with international humanitarian law" (Al Monitor 2016). However, there 
remain (as yet unanswered) factual and legal discrepancies between allegations and the 
JIAT response (HRW 2017). The formation of the JIAT and increased public 
communications are presented by the UK Government as evidence that the Saudis are 
learning lessons and learning to comply, and be seen to comply, with IHL (Crompton 
2016, para 85a). There is also a clear legitimation function in play, however. The UK runs 
workshops with the Saudis given its “considerable experience of prosecuting air 
campaigns in the full view of the world’s media,” and these workshops “may provide 
additional evidence to support our defence of the Judicial Review” (Watkins 2016). The 
UK’s experience of managing criticism in war is deployed to help an ally whose conduct 
has become controversial for the UK at home.  
Conclusion  
 The practices surveyed in this article have been central to justifying UK arms 
export policy towards Saudi Arabia. Managing criticism has proved challenging for the 
government: in January 2017 Foreign Minister Boris Johnson conceded that the UK is only 
“narrowly on the right side” of its export control commitments (quoted in Wintour 2017). 
The High Court eventually agreed with the government, in a decision that has been 
roundly criticised by campaigners, who promise to seek an appeal.  But beyond questions 
of lawfulness, there are also political questions around the ways in which policy is 
implemented; how controversial or unpopular arms exports are justified and facilitated; 
and how governments manage the competing demands of satisfying domestic opinion 
and relations with arms recipients. In the Saudi case the UK government is caught 
between two sets of demands: for secrecy and ongoing arms supplies by the Saudi regime; 
and for transparency and restrictions on exports by domestic activists and some 
parliamentarians. 
In terms of ramifications of this case, paying attention to the management of 
criticism poses challenges for a “name and shame” strategy that attempts to mobilise 
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normative concern in pursuit of more restrictive arms export policies. Campaign groups 
and NGOs “tap into states’ domestic reputational concerns and motivate some 
compliance” with arms transfer control commitments (Erickson 2015, 19). Hoisting 
states on the petard of their own publicly made normative commitments is one of the 
strongest tools available to activists. But the Saudi case is simultaneously an easy and a 
hard case: the scale of civilian harm in the war in Yemen is such that any reasonable 
application of a framework of “clear risk” should result in the denial of arms exports. But 
Saudi Arabia is economically, militarily and diplomatically important to the British 
establishment. Norms of national security and diplomatic relations that emphasise 
reliability of arms supplies are stronger in this case than those of humanitarian values 
that would restrict transfers. How to mobilise normative commitments in pursuit of 
compliance – indeed, whether this remains a viable strategy – is probably the biggest 
challenge facing arms trade activists in liberal democracies. In the post-Brexit context of 
the amplification of the importance of arms exports to the economy and of diplomatic 
relations with Middle Eastern states, now with the added stamp of legal confirmation, this 
seems a dim prospect.  
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